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Abstract
We survey a host of results from discrete geometry that have bearing on
the analysis of geometric models of approval voting. Such models view the
political spectrum as a geometric space, with geometric constraints on voter
preferences. Results on piercing numbers then have a natural interpreta-
tion in voting theory, and we survey their implications for various classes of
geometric constraints on voter approval sets.
Keywords: approval voting; piercing numbers; hypergraphs; piercing set;
political spectrum
1. Introduction
The theory of set intersections has a natural connection to the study of
approval voting. In approval voting, voters cast votes for as many candidates
as they wish, and the candidate with the most votes wins the election [1].
Approval voting has been championed as an election system that tends to
elect moderate candidates and reduces the incentive to vote strategically
[2, 3, 4], has desirable game-theoretic properties [5], and can be a favorable
alternative to plurality voting (e.g., see [6, 7, 8, 9]).
The connection between approval voting and geometry arises from think-
ing of the political spectrum as a geometric space. By political spectrum,
we refer to the set of all possible political positions that voters can hold.
Presently, for simplicity, we shall assume that every point of the political
spectrum is represented by a candidate, so that ‘candidate’ and ‘position on
∗Corresponding author.
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Figure 1: Approval sets of 5 voters in a linear society.
the spectrum’ are synonymous. The political spectrum is often modeled as
a line, with conservative candidates on the right and liberal candidates on
the left. In other settings, a spectrum could be multi-dimensional [10], or
circular [11], etc.
Berg et al. [12] initiated the following model that ties intersections of
geometric sets to approval voting. We assume each voter has an approval
set : the positions on the spectrum that she finds acceptable to vote for.
Such a set may have some restrictions that are natural for a given problem.
For instance, in Rd, an approval set is naturally a convex set if when the
voter approves candidates x and y, she would also approve any candidate
on a straight line between x and y. But there are many other potential
restrictions.
A political spectrum, with a collection of voters and their approval sets,
is called a society. Thus we may think of a society S with n voters as a pair
(X,E) where X is a political spectrum and E is a collection of n approval
sets that are subsets of X. We define the agreement proportion a(S) of a
society S to be the largest fraction of voters who can agree on a candidate.
If x ∈ X is a candidate who lies in the largest number of approval sets and
that number is k, then we call x an approval winner (there may be many)
and we see that a(S) = k/n. Thus studying approval voting is equivalent to
understanding the ways that sets in X can intersect.
In discrete geometry, there are a number of theorems of the following type:
given some ‘local’ intersection property, some ‘global’ intersection property
must hold. A ‘local’ property could be information like ‘every two elements
of E intersect’ or ‘when we pick 10 elements in E some 3 of them have a
common point’ and the ‘global’ conclusion is of the form ‘there is a point x
that lies in at least half the sets of E’ or ‘there is a set of 7 points where
each set of E contains at least one of these points’. Such theorems about set
intersections can be translated to statements about approval voting.
For instance, it follows from a classical theorem of Helly (discussed later)
that a collection of pairwise-intersecting intervals must have a point common
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to all the sets. The implication for a society whose political spectrum is a
line and approval sets are intervals (such a society is called a linear society)
is that if approval sets are pairwise intersecting, then there is a candidate
who receives the approval of every voter, i.e., a(S) = 1. Here we see a
rather strong hypothesis yields a rather strong conclusion, but we may be
more interested in situations when we can guarantee a weaker conclusion.
For instance, what hypotheses would guarantee the approval winner gets at
least half the votes, or some other fraction of the votes? A first result in this
direction is the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Berg et al. [12]). Let S be a linear society such that for every
subset of m voters, some k of them agree on a candidate. Then a(S) ≥ k−1
m−1 .
The authors note this bound can be improved slightly based on the rela-
tionship between k and m. If m− 1 = (k − 1)q + r for r < k − 1, they show
a(S) ≥ dn−r
q
e/n, where n is the number of voters. For any n ≥ m this gives
the bound above, and as n→∞, this bound converges to k−1
m−1−r .
Since then there have been a number of other results of this type (e.g.
[13, 11, 10, 14]) that consider other hypotheses on approval sets and other
geometric spaces for the political spectrum X. These results are all in some
sense variants of Helly’s Theorem.
This paper grew out of the realization that another concept from discrete
geometry, the piercing number of a collection of sets, has a natural inter-
pretation in voting theory, and a host of results about the piercing number
readily translate into results about approval voting. A piercing set of a col-
lection of sets E is a set of points intersecting every set in E. The piercing
number of E is the minimal size of a piercing set. If E is a collection of voter
approval sets of society S, then a piercing set is a representative candidate
set of S: a set of candidates such that each voter is happy with at least one
of the candidates. Thus results about piercing numbers have implications in
approval voting on the size of possible representative candidate sets, as well
as on the agreement proportions of societies.
The goal of our paper is to survey a selection of these results for the
social choice community who may not yet be familiar with these results from
discrete geometry. We are not attempting to be exhaustive; rather our intent
is to give the reader a flavor of these results and their interpretations. We
will cite known piercing results as theorems with references, and we state
their implications for approval voting as corollaries.
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We should mention that there is work on the social choice side that con-
siders approval sets and their intersections (e.g., [15], [16] ) though these
generally have not focused, as mathematicians have, on the geometric nature
of the sets involved.
2. Hypergraphs
A society S = (X,E) is an example of a structure known as a hypergraph.
A hypergraph H is a pair (X,E) where X is a set and E is a collection of
subsets of X. An element of X is called a vertex of H and an element of E
is called an edge of H (and thus X and E are the vertex set and edge set
of H, respectively). The degree of a vertex v in X is the number of edges
in E containing v. The maximum degree in H is denoted by ∆(H). The
terminology comes from graph theory. A graph is a collection of vertices and
edges, where each edge is a subset of two vertices, and a hypergraph is a
generalization of a graph in which edges can be arbitrary subsets of vertices.
In our situation, a society S = (X,E) is a hypergraph in which the
political spectrum X is the vertex set, and the collection of all approval
sets E is the edge set. Note that the term ‘edge’ is just a reference to the
hypergraph structure, and is unrelated to the geometry of approval sets that
we examine in various settings. Each ‘edge’ in the hypergraph represents the
approval set of a voter. Then |E| is the number of voters, and the degree
∆(S) is the size of the largest number of approval sets that contain a point of
X in common, which we will call the agreement number. Then the agreement
proportion, the maximal fraction of sets that contain a point in common, is
given by
a(S) :=
∆(S)
|E| .
Given a hypergraph H = (X,E), a cover of H is a set C ⊆ X such that
every edge of H contains a point in C, namely, for every e ∈ E we have
e ∩ C 6= ∅. A cover gets its name from the fact that it touches every edge
in E, so notice that a cover is precisely a piercing set of E. And when the
hypergraph is a society S = (X,E), a cover is just a representative candidate
set of S.
We can define the piercing number τ(H) of a hypergraph H = (X,E)
to be the piercing number of its edge set E. It is sometimes also called the
covering number or stabbing number. The following is an easy observation
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on the connection between the agreement proportion and piercing number of
a hypergraph H:
Observation 2. a(H) ≥ 1
τ(H)
.
Proof. Let H = (X,E). Suppose that C ⊆ X is a piercing set of H of size
τ(H). Then every edge in E intersects C. By the pigeonhole principle there
exists a point c ∈ C that intersects at least |E|
τ(H)
edges, and thus the degree
of c is at least |E|
τ(H)
. Thus ∆(H) ≥ |E|
τ(H)
, implying the observation.
Thus one way to give lower bounds on a(S) is to bound from above the
piercing number τ(S). This is where discrete geometry comes to our aid;
in many cases, upper bounds on piercing numbers have been extensively
studied. In the next sections, we look at several classes of piercing number
results and their implications.
3. Rd-convex societies
Helly’s theorem, proved by Edouard Helly in 1913 and later published in
[17], asserts that if a family F of convex sets in Rd has the property that
every d + 1 sets in F have a non-empty intersection, then all the sets in F
have a non-empty intersection. Equivalently, we can state Helly’s theorem
as follows:
Theorem 3 (Helly’s theorem). Suppose that H is a hypergraph on vertex set
Rd and edge set E consisting of convex sets in X. If every d + 1 sets in E
intersect, then τ(H) = 1.
Following [12], we define an Rd-convex society to be a society S = (Rd, E)
in which E consists of convex sets. Observation 2 then implies the following
corollary:
Corollary 4 (Berg et al. [12]). Suppose that S is an Rd-convex society. If
every d + 1 voters agree on a candidate, then a(S) = 1, that is, there exists
a candidate representing all the voters.
Helly’s theorem initiated the broad area of research in discrete geometry
that deals with questions about piercing numbers in families of convex (or
“almost convex”) sets satisfying certain intersection properties.
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Figure 2: Approval sets of 7 voters in an R2-convex society.
Given integers p ≥ q > 1, a family F of sets is said to satisfy the (p, q)-
property if among every p sets in F there exist q sets with a non-empty
intersection.
In this terminology, Helly’s theorem says that if a family F of convex sets
in Rd satisfies the (d+1, d+1)-property then τ(F) = 1. Finding the piercing
number of families of sets in Rd satisfying the (p, q)-property has been known
in the literature as the (p, q)-problem.
Hadwiger and Debrunner [18] conjectured in 1957 that the (p, q)-property
in a family F of convex sets in Rd implies that τ(F) is bounded by a constant
depending on d, p, and q. They proved this under the condition that (d −
1)p < d(q − 1) in the stronger following form:
Theorem 5 (Hadwiger–Debrunner [18]). Let F be a finite family of convex
sets in Rd satisfying the (p, q)-property for p ≥ q > 1. If (d− 1)p < d(q − 1)
then τ(F) ≤ p− q + 1.
In 1992 Alon and Kleitman [19] resolved the Hadwiger–Debrunner con-
jecture, proving that in families of convex sets in Rd that satisfy the (p, q)-
property, the piercing numbers are bounded by a constant:
Theorem 6 (Alon–Kleitman [19]). Let p ≥ q ≥ d + 1 be integers. Then
there exists a constant c = c(d; p, q) depending only on d, p, q, such that if a
family F of convex sets in Rd satisfies the (p, q)-property then τ(F) ≤ c.
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In the language of societies, the (p, q)-property for approval sets becomes
the condition that among every p voters, some q of them can approve a
common candidate. Berg et al. [12] call such a society (q, p)-agreeable, since
“some q out of every p voters can agree on a candidate”. It is unfortunate
that the parameters p, q are in a different order for the (p, q)-property and
(q, p)-agreeability, but it is easy to remember which one is which because q
is always at most p.
By Observation 2, we have:
Corollary 7. Let p ≥ q ≥ d + 1 be integers. Then there exists a constant
t = t(d; p, q) depending only on d, p, q, such that in any Rd-convex (q, p)-
agreeable society, we have a(S) ≥ t.
In general, the bounds given by Alon and Kleitman’s proof for c(d; p, q)
(and hence for t(d; p, q)) are far from being optimal. For example, the Alon–
Kleitman proof gives c(2; 4, 3) ≤ 253, however, in [20] it was proved that at
most 13 points are needed to pierce a family of convex sets in R2 that satisfies
the (4, 3)-property. We can therefore conclude:
Corollary 8. If S is an R2-convex (3, 4)-agreeable society, then there exist
13 candidates representing all voters.
Observation 2 then implies that a(S) ≥ 1
13
in this instance. However, a
better bound was proved in [12] which implies in this instance that a(S) ≥
0.09. This bound follows from the following more general result based on the
Fractional Helly Theorem:
Theorem 9 (Berg et al. [12]). Let d ≥ 1 and p ≥ q ≥ 2 be integers. Then
in every Rd-convex (q, p)-agreeable society,
a(S) ≥ 1−
(
1−
(
q
d+1
)(
p
d+1
)) 1d+1 .
Since there is no known example of a family of convex sets in R2 that
satisfies the (4, 3)-property for which the piercing number exceeds 3, we make
the following conjecture:
Conjecture 10. If S is an R2-convex (3, 4)-agreeable society, then there exist
3 candidates representing all voters. In particular, a(S) ≥ 1
3
.
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Over the last few decades extensive research has been done to improve
the Alon–Kleitman bounds, see e.g., [20, 21, 22]. For an excellent survey on
the (p, q)-problem we refer the reader to [23].
Practically speaking, some may wonder how useful such theorems are,
since it may be hard for a society to satisfy (q, p)-agreeability. However,
even when such theorems fail, they may fail softly, i.e., if a society isn’t
(q, p)-agreeable, large subset may be, so that a corresponding result can be
obtained.
4. Rd-ball societies
In many cases the upper bounds on the piercing number improve signifi-
cantly if we restrict ourselves to families of “nice” sets. One such example is
a result by Danzer, who proved:
Theorem 11 (Danzer [24]). If a family of disks in R2 satisfies the (2, 2)-
property, then τ(F) ≤ 4.
A society S = (Rd, E) where E consists of balls in Rd will be called an
Rd-ball society. Danzer’s theorem implies:
Corollary 12. In an R2-ball society S, if every two voters agree on a can-
didate then there are 4 candidates representing all the voters. In particular,
a(S) ≥ 1
4
.
A generalization of Danzer’s theorem was proved by Karasev [25], which
implies:
Corollary 13. Let S be an Rd-ball society in which every d voters agree on
some candidate.
• If d = 3, 4 then there exist 4(d + 1) candidates representing all the
voters. In particular, a(S) ≥ 1
4(d+1)
.
• If d > 5 then there exist 3(d+ 1) candidates representing all the voters.
In particular, a(S) ≥ 1
3(d+1)
.
Kyncˇl and Tancer [21] showed that if we restrict ourselves to families
F of unit disks in R2, namely, disks with radius 1 each, or to families of
line segments in Rd, then the (4, 3)-property implies τ(F ) ≤ 3. We call the
corresponding conditions for societies an R2-unit disk society and Rd-line
segment society, respectively. We have:
8
Theorem 14. Let S be an R2-unit disk society or an Rd-line segment society.
If in every set of 4 voters some 3 agree on a candidate, then there exist 3
candidates representing all voters. In particular, a(S) ≥ 1
3
.
Figure 3: Approval sets of 7 voters in an R2-box society.
5. Rd-box societies
Another example of “nice” sets are axis-parallel boxes. A society S on
vertex set Rd in which the approval sets are axis-parallel boxes will be called
an Rd-box society. Axis-parallel boxes can arise naturally as approval sets
in cases where the political spectrum is multidimensional, and the axes rep-
resent separate issues. Each voter specifies an interval on each axis, repre-
senting their approval or disapproval of that single issue, and a candidate is
approved by the voter if and only if the voter approved the candidate with
respect to every issue. This guarantees that the preferences over a product
is a box.
Theorem 15 (Berg et al. [12]). Let d ≥ 1 and p, q ≥ 2 be integers with
q ≤ p ≤ 2q − 2, and let S be a (q, p)-agreeable Rd-box society with n voters.
Then
a(S) ≥ 1− p− q
n
,
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and this bound is best possible.
Thus when q is more than about half the size of p, the agreement pro-
portion is rather large and close to 1 for a large number of voters. When
q = p ≥ 2 (that is, for pairwise intersecting boxes) this result implies that
there is a candidate that belongs to every voter approval set, and thus in this
case, a(S) = 1.
We do not have strong general results when q < p/2 + 1. Many have
examined the case q = 2. In particular, the following is a long-standing
conjecture in dimension 2:
Conjecture 16 (Wegner [26], Gy´arfa´s–Lehel [27]). If a family F of axis-
parallel rectangles in R2 satisfies the (p, 2)-property, then τ(F) ≤ 2(p− 1).
Conjecture 16, if true, would imply that (2, p)-agreeable R2-box societies
S satisfy a(S) ≥ 1
2(p−1) .
Ka´rolyi [28] proved that in families F of axis-parallel boxes in Rd that
satisfy the (p, 2)-property we have τ(F) ≤ (p − 1) (1 + log (p− 1))d−1. We
thus have:
Corollary 17. If S is a (2, p)-agreeable Rd-box society, then
a(S) ≥ 1
(p− 1) (1 + log (p− 1))d−1 .
6. Societies with Interval and d-interval approval sets
For political spectra that are lines, closed intervals are natural approval
sets to consider, since they represent voters with the property that when the
voter likes two candidates they would also like any candidate in between.
As indicated above, these are called linear societies [12] and Theorem 1 was
the first result on linear societies. Of course, linear societies are also 1-box
societies, but the results of the prior section are not stronger than Theorem
1 when d = 1.
Recall that Helly’s theorem for d = 1 implies that if F is a family of
intervals in which every two intervals intersect, then all the intervals in F
intersect. This fact was generalized by Gallai for families of intervals that
satisfy the (p, 2)-property:
Theorem 18 (Gallai, (see [27])). If F is a finite family of intervals in R
satisfying the (p, 2)-property, then τ(F) ≤ p− 1.
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Figure 4: Approval sets of 6 voters in a 2-interval society with approval proportion 4/6.
Gallai’s theorem implies for (2, p)-agreeable linear societies that a(S) ≥
1
p−1 , a result also implied by Theorem 1. However, Theorem 1 does not imply
Gallai’s theorem.
Gallai’s theorem can be further generalized to families of intervals that
satisfy the (p, q)-property. Indeed, by Theorem 5, if p ≥ q > d are integers
satisfying the condition (d − 1)p < d(q − 1), then every family F of convex
sets in Rd that satisfy the (p, q)-property has τ(F) ≤ p− q+ 1. Note that in
the case d = 1 the above condition always holds. Therefore we have:
Corollary 19. In a (q, p)-agreeable linear society where p ≥ q ≥ 2 there
exist p− q + 1 candidates representing all voters.
This implies that such societies satisfy a(S) ≥ 1
p−q+1 ; however, Theorem
1 implies for such societies that
a(S) ≥ q − 1
p− 1
which is the same conclusion when q = 2 and is stronger when q > 3.
What if the approval sets are not intervals but intervals with gaps? Such
situations can occur if voters generally approve an interval of positions, but
want to rule out intermediate candidate(s) for reasons unrelated to their
political position. For instance, a voter likes candidates x and z, but dis-
likes some candidate y for personal reasons. Such situations give rise to the
approval sets that are d-intervals.
A d-interval is the union of at most d disjoint closed intervals in R. A
society S = (R, E) will be called a d-interval society and each approval set
is a d-interval. The case of 2-interval societies (double interval societies) was
studied in [13].
It turns out that finding the piercing numbers of families of d-intervals is
not an easy task. Tardos [29] and Kaiser [30] used topological methods to
prove that if a family of d-intervals satisfies the (p, 2)-property then τ(H) ≤
(d2 − d+ 1)(p− 1). This translates as follows:
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Corollary 20. Let S be a (2, p)-agreeable d-interval society. Then there exist
d2 − d+ 1 candidates representing all voters. In particular,
a(S) ≥ 1
d2 − d+ 1 .
When d = 2 this answers the question of [13], who conjectured that
a(S) ≥ 1
3
.
Matousˇek [31] showed that this bound is not far from the truth: there
are examples of families of d-intervals with the (2, 2)-property in which τ =
c( d
2
log d
) for some constant c.
The notion of a d-interval is closely related to the notion of a separated
d-interval, which is defined to be the union of d (possibly empty) intervals,
one on each of d fixed parallel lines.
This corresponds to a society which voters express preferences over d dif-
ferent issues, and each issue has a political spectrum that is a line. Further-
more each voter has an approval set over each issue that is a closed interval.
A voter will be happy if they can get one of their approved candidates elected
in at least one of these spectra.
We call such a society a separated d-interval society. Such a society S =
(X,E) is one in which X is the union of d copies of R and each element of E is
a separated d-interval. Tardos [29] and Kaiser [30] studied these as well and
determined for a family of separated d-intervals satisfying the (p, 2)-property,
τ(H) ≤ (d2 − d)(p− 1).
Kaiser and Rabinovich [32] proved that if a family of separated d-intervals
satisfies the (p, p)-property for p = dlog2(d + 2)e, then τ(H) = d. Thus we
have:
Corollary 21. In a separated d-interval society S, if every dlog2(d + 2)e
voters agree on a candidate, then there exist d candidates representing all
voters. In particular,
a(S) ≥ 1
d
.
Zerbib [33] proved a generalization of these bounds to families of d-
intervals that satisfy the (p, q)-property. She proved that if H is a family
of d-intervals that satisfies the (p, p)-property for some integer p > 1, then
τ(H) ≤ p 1p−1d pp−1 + d, and if H satisfies the (p, q)-property for some integers
p ≥ q > 1, then
τ(H) ≤ max
{2(ep) qq−1
q
d
q
q−1 + d, 2p2d
}
.
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This implies the following:
Corollary 22. Let S be a d-interval society.
• If S satisfies the (p, p)-property (namely, If every p voters in S agree
on a candidate), then there exist p
1
p−1d
p
p−1 + d candidates representing
all voters. In particular,
a(S) ≥ 1
p
1
p−1d
p
p−1 + d
.
• If S satisfies the (p, q)-property (namely, in every set of p voters in S
there exist q that agree on a candidate), then there exist
max
{2(ep) qq−1
q
d
q
q−1 + d, 2p2d
}
candidates representing all voters. In particular,
a(S) ≥ min
{ q
2(ep)
q
q−1d
q
q−1 + dq
,
1
2p2d
}
.
7. d-tree Societies
Viewed as a discrete object, a family of d-intervals is a collection of sub-
graphs of a path G, each consisting of at most d connected components. Alon
[34] extended this setting to collections of subgraphs of a tree G. Let G be a
tree and let E be a collection of subgraphs of G, each consisting of at most
d connected components.
The corresponding social choice model has been studied [35]. Consider
a society S = (X,H) whose spectrum X is a vertex set of a tree G, and
each approval set in H is an induced subgraph of G that has at most d
connected components. As discussed in [35], G may be a tree of train tracks
and each approval set corresponds to a different train company and records
on which portion of the track they have trains running. A piercing set then
corresponds to good locations for stations where riders can transfer between
various train companies.
Alon proved that if H is a family of d-trees that satisfy the (p, 2)-property,
then τ(H) ≤ 2(p− 1)d2. This implies:
13
Figure 5: Approval sets of 10 voters in a circular society.
Corollary 23. If S is a (2, p)-agreeable d-tree society, then there exist 2(p−
1)d2 candidates representing all voters. In particular,
a(S) ≥ 1
2(p− 1)d2 .
Zerbib [33] showed that the bounds in Corollary 22 extend to d-trees as
well. Hence:
Corollary 24. The bounds in Corollary 22 extend to d-trees societies.
8. Final remarks
1. There is some literature on circular societies (namely societies whose
approval sets are circular arcs) [11, 35]. Hardin’s result [11] is that in a
circular (q, p)-agreeable society S we have a(S) ≥ q−1
p
, and this bound is
tight. As for piercing numbers of such families, it is easy to see that an
upper bound on the piercing numbers of a families of circular arcs with the
(p, q)-property is the upper bound on the piercing numbers of families of
intervals satisfying the same property, plus 1. Indeed, given a family of
circular arcs, choosing one point on the circle arbitrarily and removing all
members in the family that are pierced by this point, we obtain a family of
intervals.
2. Fractional and weighted variants of the piercing number are known in
the literature. A fractional cover of a hypergraph H = (X,E) is a function
f : X → R≥0 such that
∑
v∈e f(v) ≥ 1 for every e ∈ E. The fractional
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piercing number, usually denoted by τ ∗(H), is min
∑
v∈X f(v), where the
minimum is taken over all fractional covers f of H. Can a corresponding
fractional approval proportion be defined? Does this number carry some
practical meaning in the theory of approval voting?
Similarly, given a hypergraph H = (X,E) with an integral weight system
w(e) ≥ 1 for every edge e ∈ E, one can define a w-cover as a multiset M
of vertices in X for which |M ∩ e| ≥ w(e) for every e ∈ E. The w-piercing
number τw(H) is min |M |, where the minimum is taken over all w-covers
M of H. What is the corresponding weighted approval proportion? What
practical meaning does it have?
3. Our last remark is about discrete models in approval voting. In this
survey we assumed (as was done previously in this area) that candidates exist
at every point of a political spectrum. However, in practice, this may not
be the case. This means that when approval sets intersect, there may not
necessarily be a candidate in the intersection (though for linear societies this
cannot happen, see [12]). For societies that are not linear, what can be said
about approval proportions when there are a finite number of candidates in
a political spectrum?
Let us call a model in which the number of candidates is considered to be
finite a discrete model. The rank of a hypergraph H = (X,E) is the maximal
size of an edge in E. Translated to the language of approval voting, the rank
of a society with a discrete model is the maximal size of an approval set. The
following is a simple observation on hypergraphs of rank r:
Observation 25. If a hypergraph H of rank r satisfies the (p, 2)-property
then τ(H) ≤ r(p− 1).
Proof. Let E ′ ⊂ E be a subset of pairwise disjoint edges in E. Then |E ′| ≤
p − 1 and every edge in E intersects some edge in E ′. Thus the set ⋃E ′ is
a cover of H, and its size is at most r(p− 1).
Thus we have:
Corollary 26. In a society S with a discrete (2, p)-agreeable model of rank
r, a(S) ≥ 1
r(m−1) .
In some cases this can be slightly improved. Conjecturally, one such case
is when the discrete model is r-partite. An r-partite hypergraph H = (X,E)
is a hypergraph whose vertex set X has a partition X = X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xr,
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and every edge e ∈ E has |e ∩ Xi| = 1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Thus a 2-
partite hypergraph is just a bipartite graph. A famous conjecture of Ryser
[36] is that an r-partite hypergraph H which satisfies the (p, 2)-property has
τ(H) ≤ (r − 1)(p − 1). This conjecture is wide open for r ≥ 4. The r = 2
case is known as Ko¨nig’s theorem, and the r = 3 case was settled by Aharoni
[37]. Let us define a discrete r-partite model accordingly. Then the above
translates to approval voting:
Conjecture 27. Suppose that a society S with a discrete r-partite model
has the property that in every subset of p voters some 2 of them agree on a
candidate (that is, it satisfies the (p, 2)-property). Then a(S) ≥ 1
(r−1)(p−1) .
Theorem 28. Let S be a (2, p)-agreeable society. If S has a discrete bipartite
model then a(S) ≥ 1
p−1 , and if S has a discrete 3-partite model then a(S) ≥
1
2(m−1) .
What about piercing numbers in discrete hypergraphs (namely hyper-
graphs with finitely many vertices) with no bounded rank? Doignon [38]
proved a Helly-type theorem for families in which every set is obtained by
the intersection of a convex set C ⊂ Rd with the integer lattice Zd; it states
that a finite family of convex sets in Rd intersects at a point of Zd if every
2d of members of the family intersect at a point of Zd. Thus we have:
Theorem 29. Suppose that a society S has a discrete model in which the
candidates are represented by the integer lattice Zd, and each approval set is
given by an intersection of a convex set C ⊂ Rd with Zd. If every 2d agree
on a candidate then all the voters agree on a candidate, namely a(S) = 1.
There are related works where the integer lattice is replaced by some
other proper set L ⊂ Rd (see e.g., [39] and the reference therein). The more
general (p, q)-property in such families has not been studied.
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